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We study the design of optimal monetary policy under uncertainty in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models. We use a Markov jump-linear-quadratic (MJLQ) approach to study policy design,
approximating the uncertainty by different discrete modes in a Markov chain, and by taking mode-dependent
linear-quadratic approximations of the underlying model. This allows us to apply a powerful methodology
with convenient solution algorithms that we have developed. We apply our methods to a benchmark
New Keynesian model, analyzing how policy is affected by uncertainty, and how learning and active













noahw@princeton.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In previous work, Svensson and Williams [16] and [17], we have developed methods to study optimal
policy in Markov jump-linear-quadratic (MJLQ) models with forward-looking variables: models
with conditionally linear dynamics and conditionally quadratic preferences, where the matrices
in both preferences and dynamics are random. In particular, each model has multiple “modes,”
a ﬁnite collection of diﬀerent possible values for the matrices, whose evolution is governed by a
ﬁnite-state Markov chain. In our previous work, we have discussed how these modes could be
structured to capture many diﬀerent types of uncertainty relevant for policymakers. Here we put
those suggestions into practice. First, we brieﬂy discuss how an MJLQ model can be derived as a
mode-dependent linear-quadratic approximation of an underlying nonlinear model. Then, we apply
our methods to a simple empirical mode-dependent New Keynesian model of the U.S. economy, a
variant of a model by Lindé [11].
In a ﬁrst paper, Svensson and Williams [16], we studied optimal policy design in MJLQ models
when policymakers can or cannot observe the current mode, but we abstracted from any learning
and inference about the current mode. Although in many cases the optimal policy under no learn-
ing (NL) is not a normatively desirable policy, it serves as a useful benchmark for our later policy
analyses. In a second paper, Svensson and Williams [17], we focused on learning and inference in
the more relevant situation, particularly for the model-uncertainty applications which interest us,
in which the modes are not directly observable. Thus, decision makers must ﬁlter their observations
to make inferences about the current mode. As in most Bayesian learning problems, the optimal
policy thus typically includes an experimentation component reﬂecting the endogeneity of informa-
tion. This class of problems has a long history in economics, and it is well-known that solutions are
diﬃcult to obtain. We developed algorithms to solve numerically for the optimal policy.1 Due to
the curse of dimensionality, the Bayesian optimal policy (BOP) is only feasible in relatively small
models. Confronted with these diﬃculties, we also considered adaptive optimal policy (AOP).2 In
this case, the policymaker in each period does update the probability distribution of the current
1 In addition to the classic literature (on such problems as a monopolist learning its demand curve), Wieland
[19]-[20] and Beck and Wieland [1] have recently examined Bayesian optimal policy and optimal experimentation in
a context similar to ours but without forward-looking variables. Tesfaselassie, Schaling, and Eijﬃnger [18] examine
passive and active learning in a simple model with a forward-looking element in the form of a long interest rate in
the aggregate-demand equation. Ellison and Valla [8] and Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent [4] study situations like
ours but where the expectational component is as in the Lucas-supply curve (Et−1πt, for example) rather than our
forward-looking case (Etπt+1, for example). More closely related to our present paper, Ellison [7] analyzes active and
passive learning in a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips curve.
2 What we call optimal policy under no learning, adaptive optimal policy, and Bayesian optimal policy has in the
literature also been referred to as myopia, passive learning, and active learning, respectively.
1mode in a Bayesian way, but the optimal policy is computed each period under the assumption that
the policymaker will not learn in the future from observations. In our setting, the AOP is signiﬁ-
cantly easier to compute, and in many cases provides a good approximation to the BOP. Moreover,
the AOP analysis is of some interest in its own right, as it is closely related to speciﬁcations of
adaptive learning which have been widely studied in macroeconomics (see Evans and Honkapohja
[9] for an overview). Further, the AOP speciﬁcation rules out the experimentation which some may
view as objectionable in a policy context.3
In this paper, we apply our methodology to study optimal monetary-policy design under uncer-
tainty in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. We begin by summarizing the
main ﬁndings from our previous work, leading to implementable algorithms for analyzing policy
in MJLQ models. We then turn to analyzing optimal policy in DSGE models. To quantify the
gains from experimentation we focus on a small empirical benchmark New Keynesian model. In
this model we compare and contrast optimal policies under no learning, AOP, and BOP. We ana-
lyze whether learning is beneﬁcial–it is not always so, a fact which at least partially reﬂects our
assumption of symmetric information between the policymakers and the public–and then quantify
the additional gains from experimentation.4
Since we typically ﬁnd that the gains from experimentation are small, we focus in the rest of
the paper on our adaptive optimal policy which shuts down the experimentation channel. As the
AOP is much easier to compute, this allows us to work with much larger and more empirically
relevant policy models. In the latter part of the paper, we analyze one such model, an estimated
forward-looking model which is a mode-dependent variant of Lindé [11]. There, we focus on how
optimal policy should respond to uncertainty about the degree to which agents are forward-looking,
and we show that there are substantial gains from learning in this framework.
3 In addition, AOP is useful for technical reasons as it gives us a good starting point for our more intensive
numerical calculations in the BOP case.
4 In addition to our own previous work, MJLQ models have been widely studied in the control-theory literature
for the special case when the model modes are observable and there are no forward-looking variables (see Costa,
Fragoso, and Marques [5] (henceforth CFM) and the references therein).(do Val and Ba¸ sar [6] provide an application
of an adaptive-control MJLQ problem in economics.) More recently, Zampolli [22] has used such an MJLQ model
to examine monetary policy under shifts between regimes with and without an asset-market bubble. Blake and
Zampolli [3] provide an extension of the MJLQ model with observable modes to include forward-looking variables
and present an algorithm for the solution of an equilibrium resulting from optimization under discretion. Svensson
and Williams [16] provide a more general extension of the MJLQ framework with forward-looking variables and
present algorithms for the solution of an equilibrium resulting from optimization under commitment in a timeless
perspective as well as arbitrary time-varying or time-invariant policy rules, using the recursive saddlepoint method
of Marcet and Marimon [12]. They also provide two concrete examples: an estimated backward-looking model (a
three-mode variant of Rudebusch and Svensson [14]) and an estimated forward-looking model (a three-mode variant
of Lindé [11]). Svensson and Williams [16] also extend the MJLQ framework to the more realistic case of unobservable
modes, although without introducing learning and inference about the probability distribution of modes. Svensson
and Williams [17] focus on learning and experimentation in the MJLQ framework.
2The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the MJLQ framework and summarizes our
earlier work. Section 3 presents our analysis of learning and experimentation in a simple benchmark
New Keynesian model, whereas section 4 presents our analysis in an estimated empirical New
Keynesian model. Section 5 presents some conclusions and suggestions for further work.
2 MJLQ Analysis of Optimal Policy
This section summarizes our earlier work, Svensson and Williams [16] and [17].
2.1 An MJLQ model
We consider an MJLQ model of an economy with forward-looking variables. The economy has
a private sector and a policymaker. We let Xt denote an nX-vector of predetermined variables
in period t, xt an nx-vector of forward-looking variables, and it an ni-vector of (policymaker)
instruments (control variables).5 We let model uncertainty be represented by nj possible modes
and let jt ∈ Nj ≡ {1,2,...,n j} denote the mode in period t. The model of the economy can then
be written
Xt+1 = A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1xt + B1jt+1it + C1jt+1εt+1, (2.1)
EtHjt+1xt+1 = A21jtXt + A22jtxt + B2jtit + C2jtεt, (2.2)
where εt is a multivariate normally distributed random i.i.d. nε-vector of shocks with mean zero
and contemporaneous covariance matrix Inε. The matrices A11j, A12j,. . . ,C2j have the appropriate
dimensions and depend on the mode j. As a structural model here is simply a collection of matrices,
each mode can represent a diﬀerent model of the economy. Thus, uncertainty about the prevailing
mode is model uncertainty.6
Note that the matrices on the right side of (2.1) depend on the mode jt+1 in period t +1 ,
whereas the matrices on the right side of (2.2) depend on the mode jt in period t. Equation (2.1)
then determines the predetermined variables in period t+1as a function of the mode and shocks in
period t+1and the predetermined variables, forward-looking variables, and instruments in period
t. Equation (2.2) determines the forward-looking variables in period t as a function of the mode and
shocks in period t, the expectations in period t of next period’s mode and forward-looking variables,
5 The ﬁrst component of Xt may be unity, in order to allow for mode-dependent intercepts in the model equations.
6 See also Svensson and Williams [16], where we show how many diﬀerent types of uncertainty can be mapped
into our MJLQ framework.
3and the predetermined variables and instruments in period t.T h em a t r i xA22j is non-singular for
each j ∈ Nj.
The mode jt follows a Markov process with the transition matrix P ≡ [Pjk].7 The shocks εt
are mean zero and i.i.d. with probability density ϕ, and without loss of generality we assume that
εt is independent of jt.8 We also assume that C1jεt and C2kεt are independent for all j,k ∈ Nj.
These shocks, along with the modes, are the driving forces in the model. They are not directly
observed. For technical reasons, it is convenient but not necessary that they are independent. We
let pt =( p1t,...,p njt)0 denote the true probability distribution of jt in period t.W el e tpt+τ|t denote
the policymaker’s and private sector’s estimate in the beginning of period t of the probability
distribution in period t + τ.T h eprediction equation for the probability distribution is
pt+1|t = P0pt|t. (2.3)
We let the operator Et[·] in the expression EtHjt+1xt+1 o nt h el e f ts i d eo f( 2 . 2 )d e n o t ee x p e c -
tations in period t conditional on policymaker and private-sector information in the beginning of
period t, including Xt, it,a n dpt|t, but excluding jt and εt. Thus, the maintained assumption is
symmetric information between the policymaker and the (aggregate) private sector. Since forward-
looking variables will be allowed to depend on jt, parts of the private sector, but not the aggregate
private sector, may be able to observe jt and parts of εt. Note that although we focus on the
determination of the optimal policy instrument it, our results also show how private sector choices
as embodied in xt are aﬀected by uncertainty and learning. The precise informational assumptions
and the determination of pt|t will be speciﬁed below.




δτL(Xt+τ,x t+τ,i t+τ,j t+τ) (2.4)
where δ is a discount factor satisfying 0 <δ<1,a n dt h ep e r i o dl o s s ,L(Xt,x t,i t,j t),s a t i s ﬁes

















where the matrix Wj (j ∈ Nj) is positive semideﬁnite. We assume that the policymaker optimizes





7 Obvious special cases are P = Inj, when the modes are completely persistent, and Pj. =¯ p
0 (j ∈ Nj), when the
modes are serially i.i.d. with probability distribution ¯ p.
8 Because mode-dependent intercepts (as well as mode-dependent standard deviations) are allowed in the model,
we can still incorporate additive mode-dependent shocks.
4to the intertemporal loss function in period t. A sw es h a l ls e eb e l o w ,t h enx-vector Ξt−1 is the
vector of Lagrange multipliers for equation (2.2) from the optimization problem in period t − 1.
For the special case when there are no forward-looking variables (nx =0 ), the model consists of
(2.1) only, without the term A12jt+1xt; the period loss function depends on Xt, it,a n djt only; and
there is no role for the Lagrange multipliers Ξt−1 or the term (2.6).
2.2 Approximate MJLQ models
While in this paper we start with an MJLQ model, it is natural to ask where such a model comes
from, as usual formulations of economic models are not of this type. However the same type of
approximation methods that are widely used to convert nonlinear models into their linear counter-
parts can also convert nonlinear models into MJLQ models. We analyze this issue in Svensson and
Williams [16], and present an illustration as well. Here we brieﬂy discuss the main ideas. Rather
than analyzing local deviations from a single steady state as in conventional linearizations, for an
MJLQ approximation we analyze the local deviations from (potentially) separate, mode-dependent
steady states. Standard linearizations are justiﬁed as asymptotically valid for small shocks, as an
increasing time is spent in the vicinity of the steady state. Our MJLQ approximations are asymp-
totically valid for small shocks and persistent modes, as an increasing time is spent in the vicinity
of each mode-dependent steady state. Thus, for slowly-varying Markov chains, our MJLQ provide
accurate approximations of nonlinear models with Markov switching.
2.3 Types of optimal policies
We will distinguish three cases: (1) Optimal policy when there is no learning (NL), (2) Adaptive
optimal policy (AOP), and (3) Bayesian optimal policy (BOP). By NL, we refer to a situation
when the policymaker and the aggregate private sector have a probability distribution pt|t over the
modes in period t and updates the probability distribution in future periods using the transition
matrix only, so the updating equation is
pt+1|t+1 = P0pt|t. (2.7)
That is, the policymaker and the private sector do not use observations of the variables in the
economy to update the probability distribution. The policymaker then determines optimal policy
in period t conditional on pt|t and (2.7). This is a variant of a case examined in Svensson and
Williams [16].
5By AOP, we refer to a situation when the policymaker in period t determines optimal policy
as in the NL case, but then uses observations of the realization of the variables in the economy to
update its probability distribution according to Bayes Theorem. In this case, the instruments will
generally have an eﬀect on the updating of future probability distributions, and through this channel
separately aﬀect the intertemporal loss. However, the policymaker does not exploit that channel in
determining optimal policy. That is, the policymaker does not do any conscious experimentation.
By BOP, we refer to a situation when the policymaker acknowledges that the current instruments
will aﬀect future inference and updating of the probability distribution, and calculates optimal
policy taking this separate channel into account. Therefore, BOP includes optimal experimentation,
where for instance the policymaker may pursue policy that increases losses in the short run but
improves the inference of the probability distribution and therefore lowers losses in the longer run.
2.4 Optimal policy with no learning
We ﬁrst consider the NL case. Svensson and Williams [16] derive the equilibrium under commit-
ment in a timeless perspective for the case when Xt, xt,a n dit a r eo b s e r v a b l ei np e r i o dt, jt is
unobservable, and the updating equation for pt|t is given by (2.7). Observations of Xt, xt,a n dit
are then not used to update pt|t.
It will be useful to replace equation (2.2) by the two equivalent equations,
EtHjt+1xt+1 = zt, (2.8)
0=A21jtXt + A22jtxt − zt + B2jtit + C2jtεt, (2.9)
w h e r ew ei n t r o d u c et h enx-vector of additional forward-looking variables, zt. Introducing this vector
is a practical way of keeping track of the expectations term on the left side of (2.2). Furthermore,
it will be practical to use (2.9) and solve xt as a function of Xt, zt, it, jt,a n dεt
xt =˜ x(Xt,z t,i t,j t,ε t) ≡ A−1
22jt(zt − A21jtXt − B2jtit − C2jtεt). (2.10)
We note that, for given jt, this function is linear in Xt, zt, it,a n dεt.
In order to solve for the optimal decisions, we use the recursive saddlepoint method (see Marcet
and Marimon [12], Svensson and Williams [16], and Svensson [15] for details of the recursive sad-
dlepoint method). Thus, we introduce Lagrange multipliers for each forward-looking equation, the
lagged values of which become state variables and reﬂect costs of commitment, while the current
6values become control variables. The dual period loss function can be written





˜ L( ˜ Xt,z t,i t,γt,j,ε t)ϕ(εt)dεt,
where ˜ Xt ≡ (X0
t,Ξ0
t−1)0 is the (nX + nx)-vector of extended predetermined variables (that is,
including the nx-vector Ξt−1), γt is an nx-vector of Lagrange multipliers, and ϕ(·) denotes a generic
probability density function (for εt, the standard normal density function), and where





Hjt˜ x(Xt,z t,i t,j t,ε t). (2.11)
As discussed in Svensson and Williams [16], the failure of the law of iterated expectations
leads us to introduce the collection of value functions ˆ V (st,j) which condition on the mode, while
the value function ˜ V (st) averages over these and represents the solution of the dual optimization
problem. The somewhat unusual Bellman equation for the dual problem can be written
˜ V (st) ≡ Etˆ V (st,j t) ≡
X












Z ∙ ˜ L( ˜ Xt,z t,i t,γt,j,ε t)
+δ
P




where st ≡ ( ˜ X0
t,p 0
t|t)0 denotes the perceived state of the economy (it includes the perceived proba-
bility distribution, pt|t, but not the true mode) and (st,j t) denotes the true state of the economy
(it includes the true mode of the economy). As we discuss in more detail below, it is necessary
to include the mode jt in the state vector because the beliefs do not satisfy the law of iterated
expectations. In the BOP case beliefs do satisfy this property, so the state vector is simply st.A l s o
note that in the Bellman equation we require that all the choice variables respect the information
constraints, and thus depend on the perceived state st but not the mode j directly.
The optimization is subject to the transition equation for Xt,
Xt+1 = A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1˜ x(Xt,z t,i t,j t,ε t)+B1jt+1it + C1jt+1εt+1, (2.13)
w h e r ew eh a v es u b s t i t u t e d˜ x(Xt,z t,i t,j t,ε t) for xt; the new dual transition equation for Ξt,
Ξt = γt, (2.14)

















It is straightforward to see that the solution of the dual optimization problem (2.12) is linear





















⎦ ˜ Xt, (2.16)
xt = x(st,j t,ε t) ≡ ˜ x(Xt,z(st),i(st),j t,ε t) ≡ Fx ˜ X(pt|t,j t) ˜ Xt + Fxε(pt|t,j t)εt. (2.17)
This solution is also the solution to the original primal optimization problem. We note that xt is
linear in εt for given pt|t and jt. The equilibrium transition equation is then given by
st+1 =ˆ g(st,j t,ε t,j t+1,ε t+1) ≡ g[st,z(st),i(st),γ(st),j t,ε t,j t+1,ε t+1]. (2.18)
As can be easily veriﬁed, the (unconditional) dual value function ˜ V (st) is quadratic in ˜ Xt for
given pt|t,t a k i n gt h ef o r m
˜ V (st) ≡ ˜ X0
t ˜ V ˜ X ˜ X(pt|t) ˜ Xt + w(pt|t).
The conditional dual value function ˆ V (st,j t) gives the dual intertemporal loss conditional on the
true state of the economy, (st,j t). It follows that this function satisﬁes
ˆ V (st,j) ≡
Z ∙ ˜ L( ˜ Xt,z(st),i(st),γ(st),j,ε t)
+δ
P
k Pjkˆ V [ˆ g(st,j,ε t,k,ε t+1),k]
¸
ϕ(εt)ϕ(εt+1)dεtdεt+1 (j ∈ Nj).
The function ˆ V (st,j t) is also quadratic in ˜ Xt for given pt|t and jt,
ˆ V (st,j t) ≡ ˜ X0
t ˆ V ˜ X ˜ X(pt|t,j t) ˜ Xt +ˆ w(pt|t,j t).
It follows that we have
˜ V ˜ X ˜ X(pt|t) ≡
X
j pjt|tˆ V ˜ X ˜ X(pt|t,j),w (pt|t) ≡
X
j pjt|t ˆ w(pt|t,j).
Although we ﬁnd the optimal policies from the dual problem, in order to measure true expected
losses we are interested in the value function for the primal problem (with the original, unmodiﬁed
8loss function). This value function, with the period loss function EtL(Xt,x t,i t,j t) rather than
Et˜ L( ˜ Xt,z t,i t,γt,j t,ε t),s a t i s ﬁes
















(where the second equality follows since x(st,j t,ε t) is linear in εt for given st and jt). It is quadratic
in ˜ Xt for given pt|t,
V (st) ≡ ˜ X0
tV ˜ X ˜ X(pt|t) ˜ Xt + w(pt|t)
(the scalar w(pt|t) in the primal value function is obviously identical to that in the dual value
function). This is the value function conditional on ˜ Xt and pt|t after Xt has been observed but
before xt has been observed, taking into account that jt and εt are not observed. Hence, the second
term on the right side of (2.19) contains the expectation of Hjtxt conditional on that information.9
Svensson and Williams [16] and [17] present algorithms to compute the solution and the primal
and dual value functions for the no-learning case. For future reference, we note that the value
function for the primal problem also satisﬁes
V (st) ≡
X
j pjt|tˇ V (st,j),






k Pjkˇ V [ˆ g(st,j,ε t,k,ε t+1),k]
¾
ϕ(εt)ϕ(εt+1)dεtdεt+1 (j ∈ Nj). (2.20)
2.5 Adaptive optimal policy
Consider now the case of adaptive optimal policy, where the policymaker uses the same policy
function as in the no-learning case, but each period updates the probabilities that this policy is
conditioned on. This case is thus simple to implement recursively, as we have already discussed how
to solve for the optimal decisions and below we show how to update probabilities. However, the
ex-ante evaluation of expected loss is more complex, as we show below. In particular, we assume
that C2jt 6≡ 0 and that both εt and jt are unobservable. The estimate pt|t is the result of Bayesian
updating, using all information available, but the optimal policy in period t is computed under
9 To be precise, the observation of Xt, which depends on C1jtεt, allows some inference of εt, εt|t. xt will depend on
jt and on εt,b u to nεt only through C2jtεt. By assumption C1jεt and C2kεt are independent. Hence, any observation
of Xt and C1jεt does not convey any information about C2jεt,s oEtC2jtεt =0 .
9the perceived updating equation (2.7). That is, the fact that the policy choice will aﬀect future
pt+τ|t+τ and that future expected loss will change when pt+τ|t+τ changes is disregarded. Under the
assumption that the expectations on the left side of (2.2) are conditional on (2.7), the variables zt,
it, γt,a n dxt in period t are still determined by (2.16) and (2.17).
In order to determine the updating equation for pt|t, we specify an explicit sequence of infor-
mation revelation as follows, in no less than nine steps. The timing assumptions are necessary in
order to spell out the appropriate conditioning for decisions and updating of beliefs.
First, the policymaker and the private sector enters period t with the prior pt|t−1. They know
Xt−1, xt−1 = x(st−1,j t−1,ε t−1), zt−1 = z(st−1), it−1 = i(st−1),a n dΞt−1 = γ(st−1) from the
previous period.
Second, in the beginning of period t,t h em o d ejt and the vector of shocks εt are realized. Then
the vector of predetermined variables Xt is realized according to (2.1).
Third, the policymaker and the private sector observe Xt. They then know ˜ Xt ≡ (X0
t,Ξ0
t−1)0.
They do not observe jt or εt
Fourth, the policymaker and the private sector update the prior pt|t−1 to the posterior pt|t
according to Bayes Theorem and the updating equation
pjt|t =
ϕ(Xt|jt = j,Xt−1,x t−1,i t−1,p t|t−1)
ϕ(Xt|Xt−1,x t−1,i t−1,p t|t−1)
pjt|t−1 (j ∈ Nj), (2.21)
where again ϕ(·) denotes a generic density function.10 Then the policymaker and the private sector
know st ≡ ( ˜ X0
t,p 0
t|t)0.
Fifth, the policymaker solves the dual optimization problem, determines it = i(st), and imple-
ments/announces the instrument setting it.
Sixth, the private-sector (and policymaker) expectations,
zt =E tHjt+1xt+1 ≡ E[Hjt+1xt+1 |st],
are formed. In equilibrium, these expectations will be determined by (2.16). In order to understand
their determination better, we look at this in some detail.
These expectations are by assumption formed before xt is observed. The private sector and the
policymaker know that xt will in equilibrium be determined in the next step according to (2.17).
10 The policymaker and private sector can also estimate the shocks εt|t as εt|t =
S
j pjt|tεjt|t,w h e r eεjt|t ≡
Xt − A11jXt−1 − A12jxt−1 − B1jit−1 (j ∈ Nj). However, because of the assumed independence of C1jεt and C2kεt,
j,k ∈ Nj,w ed on o tn e e dt ok e e pt r a c ko fεjt|t.
10Hence, they can form expectations of the soon-to-be determined xt conditional on jt = j,11
xjt|t = x(st,j,0). (2.22)
The private sector and the policymaker can also infer Ξt from
Ξt = γ(st). (2.23)
This allows the private sector and the policymaker to form the expectations






























where we have exploited the linearity of xt = x(st,j t,ε t) and xt+1 = x(st+1,j t+1,ε t+1) in εt and
εt+1.N o t et h a tzt is, under AOP, formed conditional on the belief that the probability distribution
in period t +1will be given by pt+1|t+1 = P0pt|t, not by the true updating equation that we are
about to specify.
Seventh, after the expectations zt have been formed, xt is determined as a function of Xt, zt,
it, jt,a n dεt by (2.10).
Eight, the policymaker and the private sector then use the observed xt to update pt|t to the new
posterior p+
t|t according to Bayes Theorem, via the updating equation
p+
jt|t =
ϕ(xt|jt = j,Xt,z t,i t,p t|t)
ϕ(xt|Xt,z t,i t,p t|t)
pjt|t (j ∈ Nj). (2.25)
Ninth, the policymaker and the private sector then leave period t and enter period t +1with
the prior pt+1|t given by the prediction equation
pt+1|t = P0p+
t|t. (2.26)
In the beginning of period t +1 , the mode jt+1 and the vector of shocks εt+1 are realized, and
Xt+1 is determined by (2.1) and observed by the policymaker and private sector. The sequence of
11 Note that 0 instead of εjt|t enters above. This is because the inference εjt|t above is inference about C1jεt,
whereas xt depends on εt through C2jεt. Since we assume that C1jεt and C2jεt are independent, there is no inference
of C2jεt from observing Xt. Hence, EtC2jtεt ≡ 0. Because of the linearity of xt in εt, the integration of xt over εt
results in x(st,j t,0t).
11the nine steps above then repeats itself. For more detail on the explicit densities in the updating
equations (2.21) and (2.25) see Svensson and Williams [17].
The transition equation for pt+1|t+1 can be written
pt+1|t+1 = Q(st,z t,i t,j t,ε t,j t+1,ε t+1), (2.27)
where Q(st,z t,i t,j t,ε t,j t+1,ε t+1) is deﬁned by the combination of (2.21) for period t+1with (2.13)












A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1x(st,j t,ε t)+B1jt+1i(st)+C1jt+1εt+1
γ(st)
Q(st,z(st),i(st),j t,ε t,j t+1,ε t+1)
⎤
⎦, (2.28)
where the third row is given by the true updating equation (2.27) together with the policy function
(2.16). Thus, we note that, in this AOP case, there is a distinction between the “perceived”
transition and equilibrium transition equations, (2.15) and (2.18), which in the bottom block include
the perceived updating equation (2.7), and the “true” equilibrium transition equation, (2.28), which
replaces the perceived updating equation (2.7) with the true updating equation (2.27).
Note that V (st) in (2.19), which is subject to the perceived transition equation, (2.15), does
not give the true (unconditional) value function for the AOP case. This is instead given by
¯ V (st) ≡
X
j pjt|tˇ V (st,j),






k Pjkˇ V [¯ g(st,j,ε t,k,ε t+1),k]
¾
ϕ(εt)ϕ(εt+1)dεtdεt+1 (j ∈ Nj). (2.29)
That is, the true value function ¯ V (st) takes into account the true updating equation for pt|t, (2.27),
whereas the optimal policy, (2.16), and the perceived value function, V (st) in (2.19), are conditional
on the perceived updating equation (2.7) and thereby the perceived transition equation (2.15). Note
also that ¯ V (st) is the value function after ˜ Xt has been observed but before xt is observed, so it
is conditional on pt|t rather than p+
t|t. Since the full transition equation (2.28) is no longer linear
due to the belief updating (2.27), the true value function ¯ V (st) is no longer quadratic in ˜ Xt for
given pt|t. Thus, more complex numerical methods are required to evaluate losses in the AOP case,
although policy is still determined simply as in the NL case.
12As we discuss in Svensson and Williams [17], the diﬀerence between the true updating equation
for pt+1|t+1, (2.27), and the perceived updating equation (2.7) is that, in the true updating equation,
pt+1|t+1 becomes a random variable from the point of view of period t, with mean equal to pt+1|t.
This is because pt+1|t+1 depends on the realization of jt+1 and εt+1.T h u s B a y e s i a n u p d a t i n g
induces a mean-preserving spread over beliefs, which in turn sheds light on the gains from learning.
If the conditional value function ˇ V (st,j t) under NL is concave in pt|t for given ˜ Xt and jt,t h e nb y
Jensen’s inequality the true expected future loss under AOP will be lower than the true expected
future loss under NL. That is, the concavity of the value function in beliefs means that learning
leads to lower losses. While it likely that ˇ V is indeed concave, as we show in applications, it need
not be globally so and thus learning need not always reduce losses. In some cases the losses incurred
by increased variability of beliefs may oﬀset the expected precision gains. Furthermore, under BOP,
it may be possible to adjust policy so as to further increase the variance of pt|t, that is, achieve a
mean-preserving spread which might further reduce the expected future loss.12 This amounts to
optimal experimentation.
2.6 Bayesian optimal policy
Finally, we consider the BOP case, when optimal policy is determined while taking the updating
equation (2.27) into account. That is, we now allow the policymaker to choose it taking into account
that his actions will aﬀect pt+1|t+1, which in turn will aﬀect future expected losses. In particular,
experimentation is allowed and is optimally chosen. For the BOP case, there is hence no distinction
between the “perceived” and “true” transition equation.












A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1˜ x(st,z t,i t,j t,ε t)+B1jt+1it + C1jt+1εt+1
γt
Q(st,z t,i t,j t,ε t,j t+1,ε t+1)
⎤
⎦. (2.30)
Then the dual optimization problem can be written as (2.12) subject to the above transition
equation (2.30). However, in the Bayesian case, matters simplify somewhat, as we do not need to
compute the conditional value functions ˆ V (st,j t), which we recall were required due to the failure
of the law of iterated expectations in the AOP case. We note now that the second term on the
12 Kiefer [10] examines the properties of a value function, including concavity, under Bayesian learning for a simpler
model without forward looking variables.
13right side of (2.12) can be written as
Etˆ V (st+1,j t+1) ≡ E
h
ˆ V (st+1,j t+1)
¯ ¯ ¯ st
i
.




ˆ V (st+1,j t+1)





¯ ¯ ¯ st
i
.
See Svensson and Williams [17] for a proof.
Thus, the dual Bellman equation for the Bayesian optimal policy is











Z ∙ ˜ L( ˜ Xt,z t,i t,γt,j,ε t)
+δ
P




where the transition equation is given by (2.30).















⎦ = F( ˜ Xt,p t|t) ≡
⎡
⎣
Fz( ˜ Xt,p t|t)
Fi( ˜ Xt,p t|t)
Fγ( ˜ Xt,p t|t)
⎤
⎦, (2.32)
xt = x(st,j t,ε t) ≡ ˜ x(Xt,z(st),i(st),j t,ε t) ≡ Fx( ˜ Xt,p t|t,j t,ε t). (2.33)
Because of the nonlinearity of (2.27) and (2.30), the solution is no longer linear in ˜ Xt for given pt|t.
The dual value function, ˜ V (st), is no longer quadratic in ˜ Xt for given pt|t. The value function of
the primal problem, V (st), is given by, equivalently, (2.19), (2.29) (with the equilibrium transition









k PjkV [¯ g(st,j,ε t,k,ε t+1)]
¾
ϕ(εt)ϕ(εt+1)dεtdεt+1. (2.34)
It it is also no longer quadratic in ˜ Xt for given pt|t. Thus, more complex and detailed numerical
methods are necessary in this case to ﬁnd the optimal policy and the value function. Therefore
little can be said in general about the solution of the problem. Nonetheless, in numerical analysis
it is very useful to have a good starting guess at a solution, which in our case comes from the AOP
case. In our examples below we explain in more detail how the BOP and AOP cases diﬀer, and
what drives the diﬀerences.
143 Learning and experimentation in a simple New Keynesian model
3.1 The model
We consider the benchmark standard New Keynesian model, consisting of a New Keynesian Phillips
curve and a consumption Euler equation (see Woodford [21] for an exposition):
πt = δEtπt+1 + γjtyt + cπεπt, (3.1)
yt = Etyt+1 − σjt (it − Etπt+1)+cyεyt + cggt, (3.2)
gt+1 = ρgt + εg,t+1. (3.3)
Here πt is the inﬂation rate, yt is the output gap, δ is the subjective discount factor (as above),
γjt is a composite parameter reﬂecting the elasticity of demand and frequency of price adjustment,
and σjt is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. There are three shocks in the model, two
unobservable shocks επt and εyt, which are independent standard normal random variables, and
the observable serially correlated shock gt. This last shock is interpretable as a “demand” shock
either coming from variation in preferences, government spending, or the underlying eﬃcient level of
output. Woodford [21] combines and renormalizes these shocks into a composite shock representing
variation in the natural rate of interest.
In the standard formulations of this model, the shocks are observable and policy responds
directly to the shocks. However, in order for there to be a nontrivial inference problem for agents,
we need some components of the shocks to be unobservable. Note that we’ve assumed that both
the slope of the Phillips curve γjt and the interest sensitivity σjt vary with the mode jt.F o rt h e
former, this could reﬂect changes in the degree of monopolistic competition (which also lead to
varying markups) and/or changes in the degree of price stickiness. The interest sensitivity shift is
purely a change in the preferences of the agents in the economy, although it could also result from
non-homothetic preferences coupled with shifts in output (in which case there would be no shift in
the preferences themselves, but the intertemporal elasticity would vary with the level of output).
Unlike our illustration above, there are no switches in the steady state levels of the variables of
interest here, as we consider the usual approximations around a zero inﬂation rate and an eﬃcient
level of output.
153.2 Optimal policy: NL, AOP, and BOP
Here we examine value functions and optimal policies for this simple New Keynesian model under






We set the following parameters, mostly following Woodford’s [21] calibration as follows: γ1 =0 .024,
γ2 =0 .075, σ1 =1 /.157 = 6.37, σ2 =1 , cπ = cy = cg =0 .5,a n dρ =0 .5. We set the loss function
parameters as: δ =0 .99, λj =2 γj,a n dμ =0 .236. Most of the structural parameters are taken
from Woodford [21], while the two modes represent reasonable alternatives. Mode 1 is Woodford’s
benchmark case, while mode 2 has a substantially smaller interest rate sensitivity (one consistent








We have two forward-looking variables (xt ≡ (πt,y t)0) and consequently two Lagrange multi-
pliers (Ξt−1 ≡ (Ξπ,t−1,Ξy,t−1)0). We have one predetermined variable (Xt ≡ gt) and the estimated
mode probabilities (pt|t ≡ (p1t|t,p 2t|t)0) (of which we only need keep track of one, p1t|t). Thus, the
value and policy functions, V (st) and i(st), are all four dimensional (st =( gt,Ξ0
t−1,p 1|t)0). Thus we
are forced for computational reasons to restrict attention to relatively sparse grids with few points.
The following plots show two-dimensional slices of the value and policy functions, focusing on the
dependence on gt and p1t|t (which we for simplicity denote by p1t in the ﬁgures). In particular, all
of the plots are for Ξt−1 =( 0 ,0)0.
Figure 3.1 shows losses under NL and BOP as functions of p1t and gt. Figure 3.2 shows the
diﬀerence between losses under NL, AOP, and BOP. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the corresponding
policy functions and their diﬀerences.
In Svensson and Williams [17] we show that learning implies a mean-preserving spread of the
random variable pt+1|t+1 (which is under learning a random variable from the vantage point of
period t). Hence, concavity of the value function under NL in p1t implies that learning is beneﬁcial,
since then a mean-preserving spread reduces the expected future loss. However, we see in ﬁgure 3.1
that the value function is actually slightly convex in p1t,s ol e a r n i n gi sn o tb e n e ﬁcial here. In
contrast, for a backward-looking example in Svensson and Williams [17], the value function is
concave and learning is beneﬁcial.
16Figure 3.1: Losses from no learning (NL) and Bayesian optimal policy (BOP)


































































Consequently, we see in ﬁgure 3.2 that AOP gives higher losses than NL. Furthermore, somewhat
surprisingly, we see that BOP gives higher losses than AOP (although the diﬀerence is very small).
This is all counter to an example with a backward-looking model in Svensson and Williams [17].
W h yi st h i sd i ﬀerent in a model with forward-looking variables? It may at least partially
be a remnant of our assumption of symmetric beliefs and information between the private sector
and the policymaker. With backward-looking models, we have generally found that learning is
beneﬁcial. Moreover, with backward-looking models, the BOP is always weakly better than the
AOP, as acknowledging the endogeneity of information in the BOP case need not mean that policy
must change. (That is, the AOP policy is always feasible in the BOP problem.) However, with
forward-looking models, neither of these conclusions holds. Under our assumption of symmetric
information and beliefs between the private sector and the policymaker, both the private sector
and the policymaker learns. The diﬀerence then comes from the way that private sector beliefs
also respond to learning and to the experimentation motive. Having more reactive private sector
beliefs may add volatility and make it more diﬃcult for the policymaker to stabilize the economy.
Acknowledging the endogeneity of information in the BOP case then need not be beneﬁcial either,
17Figure 3.2: Diﬀerences in losses from no learning (NL), adaptive optimal policy (AOP) and Bayesian
optimal policy (BOP)


































































as it may induce further volatility in agents’ beliefs. (Note that, in the forward-looking case, we
solve saddlepoint problems, and in going from AOP to BOP we are expanding the feasible set for
both the minimizing and maximizing choices.)
4 Learning in an estimated empirical New Keynesian model
In the previous section we focused on a simple small model in order to consider the impacts of
learning and experimentation. As computing BOP is computationally intensive, there are limits
to the degree of empirical realism of the models we can address in that framework. In this section
we focus on a more empirically plausible model, a version of the model of Lindé [11] that we
estimated in Svensson and Williams [16]. This model includes richer dynamics for inﬂation and the
output gap, which both have backward and forward-looking components. However, these additional
dynamics increase the dimension of the state space, which implies that it is not very feasible to
consider the BOP. Thus we focus here on the impact of learning on policy and compare NL and
AOP. In Svensson and Williams [16] we computed the optimal policy under no-learning, and here
18Figure 3.3: Optimal policies under no learning (NL) and Bayesian optimal policy (BOP)


























































we see how inference on the mode aﬀects the dynamics of output, inﬂation, and interest rates.
4.1 The model
The structural model is a mode-dependent simpliﬁcation of the model of the US economy of Lindé
[11] and is given by
πt = ωfjEtπt+1 +( 1− ωfj)πt−1 + γjyt + cπjεπt, (4.1)
yt = βfjEtyt+1 +( 1− βfj)
£
βyjyt−1 +( 1− βyj)yt−2
¤
− βrj (it − Etπt+1)+cyjεyt.
Here j ∈ {1,2} indexes the mode, and the shocks επt, εyt,a n dεit are independent standard normal
random variables. In particular, we consider a two-mode MJLQ model where one mode has forward-
and backward-looking elements, while the other is backward-looking only. Thus we specify that
mode 1 is unrestricted, while in mode 2 we restrict ωf = βf =0 , so that the mode is backward-
looking. For estimation, we also impose a particular instrument rule for it, but as we focus on
optimal policy we do not include that here.
In Svensson and Williams [16] we estimate the model on US data using Bayesian methods,
with the maximum posterior estimates given in table 4.1, with the unconditional expectation of
19Figure 3.4: Diﬀerences in policies under no learning (NL) and Bayesian optimal policy (BOP)






































Table 4.1: Estimates of the constant-coeﬃcient and a restricted two-mode Lindé model.
Parameter Mean Mode 1 Mode 2
ωf 0.0938 0.3272 0
γ 0.0474 0.0580 0.0432
βf 0.1375 0.4801 0
βr 0.0304 0.0114 0.0380
βy 1.3331 1.5308 1.2538
cπ 0.8966 1.0621 0.8301
cy 0.5572 0.5080 0.5769
the coeﬃcients for comparison. Here we see that apart from the forward-looking terms (which of
course are restricted) the variation in the other parameters across the modes is relatively minor.
There are some diﬀerences in the estimated policy functions (not reported here), but relatively
little change across modes in the other structural coeﬃcients. The estimated transition matrix P












Thus mode 2 is the most persistent and has the largest mass in the invariant distribution. This
is consistent with our estimation of the modes as shown in ﬁgure 4.1. Again, the plots show both
the smoothed and ﬁltered estimates. Mode 2, the backward-looking model mode, was experienced
the most throughout much of the sample, holding for 1961—1968 and then with near certainty
continually since 1985. The forward-looking model held in periods of rapid changes in inﬂation,
holding for both the run-ups in inﬂation in the early and late 1970s and the disinﬂationary period
20Figure 4.1: Estimated probabilities of being the diﬀerent modes. Solid lines: smoothed (full-sample)
inference. Dashed lines: ﬁltered (one-sided) inference.
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of the early 1980s. During periods of relative tranquility, such as the Greenspan era, the backward-
looking model ﬁts the data the best.
4.2 Optimal policy: NL and AOP
Using the methods described above, we solve for the optimal policy functions
it = Fi(pt|t) ˜ Xt,
where now ˜ Xt ≡ (πt−1,y t−1,y t−2,i t−1,Ξπ,t−1,Ξy,t−1)0. I nS v e n s s o na n dW i l l i a m s[ 1 6 ]w ef o c u s e d
on the observable and no-learning cases, and assumed that the shocks επt and εyt were observable.
Thus we set C2 ≡ 0 and treated the shocks as additional predetermined variables. However, to focus
on the role of learning, we now assume that those shocks are unobservable. If they were observable,
then agents would be able to infer the mode from their observations of the forward-looking variables.
We use the following loss function:
Lt = π2
t + λy2
t + ν(it − it−1)2, (4.2)
21Figure 4.2: Unconditional impulse responses to shocks under the optimal policy for the two-mode
version of the Lindé model. Solid lines: median responses under AOP. Dashed lines: median
responses under NL. Dot-dashed lines: constant-coeﬃcient responses.
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which is a common central-bank loss function. We set the weights to λ =1and ν =0 .2,a n dﬁx
the discount factor in the intertemporal loss function to δ =1 .
For ease of interpretation, we plot the distribution of the impulse responses of inﬂation, the
output gap, and the instrument rate to the two structural shocks in ﬁgure 4.2. We consider 10,000
simulations of 50 periods, and plot the median responses for the optimal policy under NL and AOP,
and the corresponding optimal responses for the constant-coeﬃcient model.13
Compared to the constant-coeﬃcient case, the mean impulse responses are consistent with larger
eﬀects of the shocks that are also longer lasting. In terms of the optimal policy responses, the AOP
and NL cases are quite similar, and in both cases the peak response to shocks is nearly the same
as in the constant-coeﬃcient case, but it comes with a delay. Again compared to the constant-
coeﬃcient case, the responses of inﬂation and the output gap are larger and more sustained when
there is model uncertainty.
13 The shocks are επ0 =1and εy0 =1 , respectively, so the shocks to the inﬂation and output-gap equations in
period 0 are mode-dependent and equal to cπj and cyj (j =1 ,2,3), respectively. The distribution of modes in period 0
(and thereby all periods) is again the stationary distribution.
22Figure 4.3: Distribution (across samples) of various statistics under the optimal policy for the
two-mode version of the Lindé model. Solid lines: AOP. Dashed lines: NL.






































Table 4.2: Average of diﬀerent statistics from 1000 simulations of 1000 periods each of our estimated
model under the no-learning (NL) and adaptive (AOP) optimal policies.
Policy Eπt Stdπt Eyt Stdyt Eit Stdit ELt
NL −0.1165 5.2057 0.1303 5.6003 0.0073 10.0239 88.4867
AOP −0.0300 3.1696 0.0299 2.7698 0.0011 9.9989 38.8710
However, here we see that learning can be beneﬁcial, as the optimal policy under AOP dampens
the responses to shocks, particularly for shocks to inﬂation. As the optimal policy responses are
nearly identical, this seems to be largely due to more accurate forecasts by the public, which lead
to more rapid stabilization.
While these impulse responses are revealing, they do not capture the full beneﬁts from learning,
as by deﬁnition they simply provide the responses to a single shock. To gain a better understanding
of the role of learning, we now simulate our model under the NL and AOP policies to compare
the realized economic performance. Table 4.2 summarizes various statistics resulting from 1000
simulations of 1000 periods each. Thus for example, the entry there under “Eπt” is the average
23Figure 4.4: Simulated time series under the optimal policy for the two-mode version of the Lindé
model. Top three panels: Solid lines: AOP. Dashed lines: NL. Bottom panel: Solid line: probability
of mode 1. Dotted line: true mode. Dashed line: unconditional probability of mode 1.
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across the 1000 simulations of the sample average (over the 1000 periods) of inﬂation, while “Std
πt” is the average across simulations of the standard deviation (in each time series) of inﬂation.
In particular, we see from the entry under “ELt” that the average period loss is less than half
under AOP compared to NL. In addition to these averages, ﬁgure 4.3 plots the distribution across
samples of the key components of the loss function. There we plot a kernel smoothed estimate of
the distribution from the 1000 simulations. We see that the distribution of sample losses is much
more favorable under AOP than under NL.
In ﬁgure 4.4 we show one representative simulation to illustrate the diﬀerences. The more
eﬀective stabilization of inﬂation and the output gap under AOP for very similar instrument-rate
settings as under NL is apparent.
245C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have presented a relatively general framework for analyzing model uncertainty and
the interactions between learning and optimization. While this is a classic issue, very little to date
has been done for systems with forward-looking variables, which are essential elements of modern
models for policy analysis. Our speciﬁcation is general enough to cover many practical cases of
interest, but yet remains relatively tractable in implementation. This is deﬁnitely true for cases
when decision makers do not learn from the data they observe (our case of no learning, NL) or when
they do learn but do not account for learning in optimization (our case of adaptive optimal policy,
AOP). In both of these cases, we have developed eﬃcient algorithms for solving for the optimal
policy, which can handle relatively large models with multiple modes and many state variables.
However, in the case of the Bayesian optimal policy (BOP), where the experimentation motive is
taken into account, we must solve more complex numerical dynamic programming problems. Thus
to fully examine optimal experimentation we are haunted by the curse of dimensionality, forcing us
to study relatively small and simple models.
Thus, an issue of much practical importance is the size of the experimentation component of
policy, and the losses entailed by abstracting from it. While our results in this paper are far from
comprehensive, they suggest that in practical settings the experimentation motive may not be a
concern. The above and similar examples that we have considered indicate that the beneﬁts of
learning (moving from NL to AOP) may be substantial, whereas the beneﬁts from experimentation
(moving from AOP to BOP) are modest or even insigniﬁcant. If this preliminary ﬁnding stands
up to scrutiny, experimentation in economic policy in general and monetary policy in particular
may not be very beneﬁcial, in which case there is little need to face the diﬃcult ethical and other
issues involved in conscious experimentation in economic policy. Furthermore, the AOP is much
easier to compute and implement than the BOP. To have this truly be a robust implication, more
simulations and cases need to be examined.
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